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ABSTRACT
Marginal Tax Rates Faced
by the AFDC Recipient:
The Case of Minnesota
Benefits from welfare programs typically decline with income, i.e., there is an
implicit tax. These tax rates can be as high as 100 percent. Eligibility for multiple
programs opens up the possibility of combined marginal tax rates exceeding 100 percent.
In this paper, the combined marginal tax rates faced by AFDC recipients in
Minnesota (1986) are calculated. The paper reveals a methodology for calculating these
rates. The results also show that low income families can face marginal tax rates well in
excess of 100 percent.

March 31, 1987
Marginal Tax Rates Faced by the AFDC Recipient
The Case of Minnesota
Ralph D. Husby
Critics of the welfare system in the United States are frequently heard to say-
something like the following:
The welfare recipient in the United States faces marginal tax rates that
approach confiscatory 100 percent levels.
Sometimes it is even said that combined marginal tax rates, for families eligible for benefits
from several welfare programs, can on occasion exceed 100 percent. A marginal tax rate is
defined as the extra tax liability that results from additional income. If earning another
dollar means paying 30 cents more in income taxes, then the marginal tax rate is 30 percent.
If a welfare recipient, upon earning one more dollar, pays 15 more cents in taxes and loses 25
cents in welfare benefits, then the combined marginal tax rate would be 40 percent. This
problem is exacerbated by the fact that many welfare recipients are eligible for a number of
programs, all having benefits which decline with income. It is the purpose of this paper to
calculate more precisely the marginal tax rates faced by welfare recipients in different
circumstances. The results indicate that this problem is even worse than many critics believe.
Many welfare recipients pay well over a dollar in increased taxes and reduced benefits for
every dollar they earn.
We will concentrate in this paper on the female headed household eligible for AFDC.
The benefit calculation, and consequently the marginal tax rate, varies depending on whether
the recipient has been on AFDC for less than four months, between four and twelve months,
or more than twelve months. In this paper, the marginal tax rate, as it varies with income,
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will be calculated for an AFDC recipient for those three different duration categories. As
earnings increase, the recipient is "taxed" since AFDC, food stamps, and public housing
benefits decrease, the earned income tax credit (EITC), currently a part of the tax code,
varies, and the recipient may be liable for social security, state and federal income taxes.
The calculations below are for a recipient residing in the state of Minnesota. The marginal
tax rates for welfare recipients can vary between states because of differences in state
income taxes and methods of calculating AFDC benefits, but the numbers below will be
typical of a welfare recipient residing in one of the higher income, industrialized states.
Calculating combined Marginal Tax Rates for Family of Three on AFDC Less than 4 Months
Our prototype family
In this paper, the calculations will be based on a hypothetical family of three: a
single female parent plus two children. Child day care expenses for this family are $100 a
month. The absent father makes no contribution to the family income and his whereabouts
are unknown to the mother. Her assets are limited to personal effects and an automobile
with a market value of about $1,000. The marginal tax rates for this hypothetical family
will be typical of welfare dependent families of other sizes and circumstances.
Calculating the AFDC and food stamp benefits (first 4 months)
We will begin with an explanation of how welfare benefits are calculated followed by
a discussion of how they change when the recipient's earnings increase. From these changes,
we can calculate a marginal tax rate.
The AFDC payment standard for a family of three in Minnesota in Spring 1986 (the
guaranteed benefit for an unemployed recipient with no other income) was $528. Suppose tha
the head of our hypothetical family earns $300 a month. The AFDC benefit then is
calculated as described in Table 1. From earnings plus EITC (the EITC is $33 if earnings arc
$300), one deducts $75 (the AFDC allowance for work related expenses), $100 (child care
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expenses), $30, and one third of remaining earnings, the "30 and a third" being a work related
"incentive." These deductions determine net earnings . $85 in this case, which are deducted
from the payment standard to determine the monthly benefit ($443 in this case). Deducting
one third of remaining earnings from gross earnings before subtracting from the payment
standard means that one third of any additional earnings is not counted against you. The
remaining two thirds of additional earnings, however, does reduce the AFDC benefit. Thus,
the AFDC program by itself, for the recipient on AFDC for the first 4 months, includes an
implicit marginal tax rate on earnings of 66 2/3 percent. The calculation of the food stamp
benefit is summarized in Table 2. A standard deduction of $98, plus 18% of earned income,
plus child day care expenses is subtracted from gross earnings to determine net food stamp
income on which the food stamp coupon allotment is based. This hypothetical family with
this income would be eligible for $75 worth of food stamps.
Calculating the public housing rent
We assume that our hypothetical family has secured public housing. [In reality, most
communities have long waiting lists for public housing, so many potentially eligible families
are not in public housing.] A person living in public housing pays either 30% of adjusted
income or 10% of gross income, whichever is larger. Ordinarily, the former amount is the
larger. The calulation for our hypothetical family is included in Table 3. Gross earnings, the
earned income tax credit, and AFDC benefits are counted as income in determining public
housing rent. The total of these three income items less child care expenses and a dependent
deduction is multiplied by thirty percent in order to determine the contribution toward rent
that this family must pay. The net income for public housing purposes turns out to be $596,
for our hypothetical family, and 30% of this is $178.80. The public housing authority would
round this up to $179.
Calculating the combined marginal tax rate
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If our hypothetical recipient now receives a raise of $100 a month (or the opportunity
of earning $400 elsewhere), how much better off will the family be? How will the benefits
change?
The calculation of AFDC and food stamp benefits at earnings level of $400 is
presented in Table 4. The AFDC benefit goes down by $74: Earnings plus EITC have
increased by $111, and 2/3 of $111 is $74. Net earnings for food stamp purposes increases by
$8 causing the food stamp allotment to decrease by an additional $2. Rent owed to the
public housing authorities would increase by $11 to $190 (see Table 5) since net income for
public housing purposes has increased by $37 ($37 x 0.3 = $11).
The determination of the combined marginal tax rate over the earnings range $300 to
$400 is summarized in Table 6. Earnings plus EITC increase by $111, but AFDC and food
stamp benefits decline by $76. The social security tax takes away another $7.15, and public
housing rent would increase by $11. The recipient would only be ahead by $16.85 as a result
of the earnings increase of $100. Thus, 83.15 percent of the increase was "taxed" away due to
the implicit taxes related to AFDC, food stamps, and public housing plus the explicit social
security tax. The fact that the EITC has increased (the implicit EITC tax over this income
range is actually a negative marginal tax) mitigates the problem, but this will not be the case
at higher income levels.
Income vs. marginal tax rate
The next step is to repeat these calculations for a number of earnings brackets. The
resulting calculations are reported in Table 7. What is disturbing is that the marginal tax
rates eventually exceeds 100 percent, reaching a maximum of 109.65 percent for earnings
between $750 and $850. Combined tax rates increase for income levels over $500, first,
because the recipient becomes liable for state and federal income taxes. [If there were no
state income tax in Minnesota, then the maximum combined marginal tax rate for the case
considered in Table 7 would be 105.15 percent rather than 109.65 percent.] The second reasor
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is that, although the marginal tax rate implicit to the EITC is a negative 11 percent up to an
annual earnings level of $5000, it is zero percent for annual earnings between $5000 and
$6500, and a positive 12 percent for gross annual earnings in excess of $6500 until the EITC
is reduced to zero. In other words, the EITC increases by $11 for every $100 earned up to
$5000, but decreases by $12 for every $100 earned above $6500 annually (or about $542 a
month).
Calculating Marginal Tax Rates
For Family of Three on AFDC More than 4
but less than 12 Months
Calculating the AFDC Benefit
The so-called "30 and a third" rule discussed above is supposed to serve as an incentive
for employment and self-sufficiency. By subtracting one third of earnings in the
determination of net (AFDC) earnings, that one third is not subtracted from the payment
standard to determine the monthly benefit. As explained above, this thirty and a third rule
leads to a 66 2/3 percent implicit tax on earnings.
After 4 months on AFDC, although the $30 continues to be subtracted, the one third is
not. By not subtracting the one third, 100 percent of any additional earnings is counted
against the recipient, meaning that there is a 100 percent nominal tax rate implicit to AFDC.
The effect that this change has on the calculation of the AFDC benefit can be seen in
Table 8. The calculations here can be contrasted with those in Table 1. By not subtracting
one third of the $128 remaining after the other deductions, the AFDC monthly benefit
becomes $400 rather than $443. More important for our purposes, since all these remaining
deductions are fixed (invariant with income), additional earnings cause the AFDC benefit to
decrease by the same number of dollars. Earnings are indeed taxed at 100 percent.
Calculating the combined marginal tax rate
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The result of this new treatment of earnings on the combined tax rate is shown in
Table 9 (compare with Table 6). Both earnings and EITC are counted as income in
calculating AFDC, so AFDC decreases by $111. However, only earnings and AFDC are
counted as income in calculating the food stamp benefit, causing total gross income for food
stamp purposes to fall by $11. Also, the 18% of earned income deduction causes adjusted
income to fall by an additional $18 (since earnings increase by $100). These two factors
cause the food stamp allotment to increase by $9. The combined marginal tax rate turns out
to be a rather breath-taking 98.15%.
As income increases, the situation gets worse before getting better. The EITC levels
off and then begins declining at the rate of $12 per $100 of earned income. Then there is
the advent of state and local taxes. When the EITC levels off, the combined rate jumps from
the vicinity of 99 to about 103 percent. For the income range $650 to $700, the effective
marginal tax rate is a whopping 118.65%. The reasons for this high rate are a) the family is
still eligible for AFDC up to (but not beyond) a $700 income, and B) it must also pay social
security, state income and federal income taxes, the federal taxes beginning in the
neighborhood of $650 in earnings. The combined rate then falls off abruptly (to 79%) above
$700 in earnings because AFDC eligibility is lost. [During the first 4 months on AFDC,
during which the family can deduct one third of earnings, AFDC eligibility extends to higher
income levels.] Even at earnings levels between $850 to $917, the combined rate is a
potentially very discouraging 86.85 percent. [At $917, the EITC has declined to zero.]
Calculating Combined Marginal Tax Rates
for our Hypothetical Family of Three,
on AFDC more than 12 Months
Calculating the AFDC benefit
After one is on AFDC for 12 months, then there is a third system for calculating the
monthly grant. After 4 months, one loses the "third" in the "30 and a third" rule. After 12
months, one also loses the "30" in that rule. The effect on the calculation is very simple and
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is described in Table 11. Instead of $205 in deductions (Table 8), there is $175 which drops
the monthly grant by $30 from $400 to $370, given earnings of $300.
Calculating the combined marginal tax rate
The combined marginal tax rates are calculated in the same manner as above and
presented in Table 12. They are nearly identical to those in Table 10 (which are relevant to
those recipients on AFDC for 4 to 12 months). The combined marginal tax rate jumps to its
apex of 116.48% at a monthly earnings level of $650 because federal income taxes begin at
about this level. Then the rate drops to around 85% at earnings levels above $675 because
AFDC eligibility, after 12 months, ceases at $674 of earnings for our hypothetical family.
Combined Marginal Tax Rates for
AFDC Families with Different Circumstances
What about larger and smaller family sizes? Are the tax rates calculated above
atypical for other types of AFDC eligible families? The answer is no. For larger or smaller
family sizes, the earnings level at which the rate peaks, and the level at which AFDC
benefits cease, will be higher or lower, but the rates themselves will be affected only
trivially. The combined tax rates revealed in Tables 7, 10, and 12 correctly dramatize the
financial disincentives faced by the low income family eligible for benefits from various
social welfare programs.
There are, however, two or three reasons why some such families would face lower
rates. First, many low income families, though technically eligible for public housing, are
without it because of the acute shortage of public housing. Second, some states do not have a
state income tax. During the first 4 months on AFDC, the presence or absence of public
housing would make a difference. Since AFDC decreases by just $67 for every $100 increase
in earnings (and EITC), the total of earnings, AFDC, and EITC goes up as earnings increase.
For the earnings bracket, $750 to $850, the combination of rising earnings and declining
AFDC and EITC would cause public housing rent to increase by 9% of earnings. If the
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family was not eligible, the combined marginal tax rate would be 100.65 percent rather than
109.65 percent. If, in addition, there were no state income tax, then the rate for this income
range would be 96.15 percent. In short, the absense of public housing from the menu of
benefits for a low income family would lower the combined marginal tax rate during the
first four months on AFDC. After 4 months, however, the effect of these two factors could
be small. Take, for example, a mother and two children on AFDC for 4 to 12 months (refer
to Table 10), earning between $650 and $700. As earnings increase by this $50 amount, the
EITC decreases by $6 and AFDC by $44 (since there is, in effect, a 100% implicit tax
connected with AFDC after 4 months). Since these three income sources -- earnings, EITC,
and cash public assistance -- are used to calculate the public housing rent, and the net change
in these three items is zero, there would be no increase in rent for the family on public
housing (in this case). Whether one is or is not on public housing will not, therefore, affect
this 118.65% figure. If there were no state income tax, however, this figure would be 116.15%
instead of 118.65%. In short, after 4 months, the presence or absence of public housing
benefits has virtually no effect on the combined rate.
Conclusion
The above material reveals that the existing U.S. welfare system contains a number of
anomolies if self sufficiency is an issue. The above discussion, however, does not exhaust the
anomolies. For example, AFDC recipients are automatically eligible for medicaid benefits.
Typically, when a family loses eligibility for AFDC benefits, medicaid benefits cease or are
substantially reduced. If, for example, a family were receiving $100 a month in medicaid
benefits, earning one more dollar could mean that both AFDC and medicaid eligibility would
cease. AFDC benefits would decline by $1 and medicaid by $100. The marginal tax rate
related to this $1 of additional earnings would be 10,100 percent; the tax rate on additional
dollars, then would immediately revert to the levels calculated in earlier sections of this
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paper. This sudden loss of benefits far in excess of the causal earnings increment has come
to be known as a "notch" in the literature on income maintenance.
It is the impression of this author, based on documents describing AFDC but not
confirmable at this time, that some states treat child day care expenses in a way that creates
another notch. If day care expenses are "reimbursed" rather than deducted as an expense, and
if reimbursement ceases when the family goes off AFDC, then the earning of one more dollar
could mean the loss of the last dollar of AFDC benefits plus all child care reimbursement
and medicaid. In this case, there would be an obvious and substantial financial incentive to
avoid reaching the earnings level that leads to a plunge in income and hence standard of
living.
Considering the Reagan administration's consistent and prolonged emphasis on
lowering marginal tax rates, particularly to the highest income groups, it is curious or ironic
that this same administration has instituted "welfare reforms" that have raised marginal tax
rates to the lowest income earners. This irony has been duly noted by others. In discussing
the changes in tax and welfare policy in the early 1980s, Stephen Rousseas makes this
statement.
As John Kenneth Galbraith has felicitously put it, the poor
won't work because they have too much money and the rich won't
work because they have too little. 1
The increase in this implicit AFDC tax rate, from 67 to 100 percent, for anyone on AFDC for
more than 4 months, is a result of a 1981 reform. Between 1967 and 1981, the thirty and a
third rule applied to all AFDC recipients, not just those on AFDC the first 4 months.
It seems to this author that a lowering of the marginal tax rate paid by low income
welfare beneficiaries would be crucial to any welfare reform aimed at increasing the self-
sufficiency of those on welfare.
1 Stephen Rousseas, The Political Economy of Reaganomics , M. E. Sharpe, Armonk,
New York, 1982, p. 43.
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Table 1.
The AFDC monthly benefit for a family of Three in Minnesota, Spring 1986,
during first 4 months on AFDC, with $100 in monthly child day care expenses,
and $300 in earnings.
$528AFDC payment standard
Earnings 300
Earned income tax cred it (EITC) 33
Earnings plus tax credits 333
Deductions:
Less $75* $ 75
Less child day care 100
Less 30** 30
205
$128
Less one third** 43
85
AFDC monthly benefit $443
*AFDC deducts $75 from earnings as an approximation of work related expenses
**During first 4 months on AFDC, and addition, al $30 and a third is deducted
an additional work incentive.
Table 2.
Calculation of the Food Stamp Benefit for our Hypothetical Family of Three
Gross earnings $300
AFDC grant 443
TOTAL INCOME 743
LESS
Standard deduction 98
18% of earned income 54
Dependent care 100
Maximum allowable shelter deductions 39
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS 291 291
NET INCOME $452
Food Stamp allotment for family
of three with $451 - $453
net income $ 75
Table 3
11
Gross earnings
EITC
AFDC
TOTAL INCOME
LESS
Dependent deduction
Child care expense
RENT PAYABLE:
Public Housing Rent Payable by
Hypothetical Family of Three
$40 x 2 = 80
100
30% of $596 = $178.80
Rounded to $179
$300
33
443
$776
180
$596
Table 4
Calculating AFDC and Food Stamp Benefits for our
Hypothetical Family of Three, Earnings equal to $400.
AFDC payment Standard
Earnings
EITC
TOTAL
LESS
$75
Child day care
$30
less one third, 79 2/3, rounded to
AFDC monthly benefit
Gross earnings
AFDC grant
TOTAL
LESS: Standard deduction
18% of earned income
Dependent care
Shelter deduction
NET INCOME
Food Stamp allotment
$400
44
444
$ 75
100
30
205
239
80
159
98
72
100
39
$528
159
$369
400
369
769
309
$460
$ 73
12
Table 5
Calculation of Rent Payable for Public Housing
When Earnings increase to $400
Gross earnings $400
EITC 44
AFDC 369
TOTAL INCOME $813
LESS
Dependent deduction, $40 x 2 = 80
Child care expense 100 180
$633
Rent Payable: 30% of $633 = $189-90
rounded to $190
Table 6
The Determination of the Combined Marginal
Tax Rate for our Hypothetical Family of
Three, Earnings Rising from $300 to $400 Monthly,
When earnings rise from $300 to $400,
Then income changes
Due to
Earnings
EITC
AFDC
Food Stamps
Social security tax (7.15%)
Public housing
State income tax
Federal income tax
NET CHANGE +$16.85
Combined marginal tax rate 83.15%
by
+$100
+ 11
- 74
2
7. 15
- 11
13
Table 7
Combined Marginal Tax Rates Resulting from
EITC, AFDC, Food Stamps, Public Housing, the Social
Security Tax, and State and Federal Income Taxes, for
Hypothetical Family during first 4 Months on AFDC
Earnings Bracket
$300 to $400
400 to 425
425 to 525
525 to 550
550 to 650
650 to 750
750 to 850
850 to 950
Marginal tax rate
83..15
85..96
89..15
88,.56
94..15
107.,65
109.,65
108..65
Table 8
Calculation of the AFDC Benefit for our Hypothetical Family of Three with
$300 in Monthly Earnings, Having Been on Welfare over 4 but less than 12
Months.
AFDC payment Standard $528
Earnings $300
EITC 33
TOTAL 333
LESS
Allowance for work expenses... $ 75
Child care 100
$30
_30
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS 205
129
AFDC monthly grant $400
14
Table 9
The Determination of the Combined Marginal Tax Rate for our
Hypothetical Family of Three, on AFDC for more than 4 but less than 12 Months
,
As Earnings Rise from $300 to $400.
When earnings rise from $300 to $400, then
income changes
Due to
Earnings
EITC
AFDC
Food stamps
Public housing
Social security tax
State income tax
Federal income tax
by
+$100
+ 11
- 111
+ 9
7.15
1.85
Combined marginal tax rate 98.15%
Table 10
Combined Marginal Tax Rates for our
Hypothetical Family of Three, on AFDC for more
than 4 but less than 12 Months, for Selected Income Brackets
Income Bracket
$300 to $400
400 to 425
425 to 525
525 to 550
550 to 650
650 to 700
700 to 750
750 to 850
850 to 917
Marginal Tax Rate
98.15%
99.15
102.15
103. 15
107. 15
118.65
79.05
86.55
86.85
15
Table 11
Calculating the AFDC Benefit for our
Hypothetical Family of Four, on
AFDC for more than 12 Months, with Earnings of $300,
Earnings $300
EITC 33
TOTAL 333
LESS
Allowance for work expenses 75
Child care 100
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS 175
Net income 158
AFDC monthly grant $370
Table 12
Combined Marginal Tax Rates for our
Hypothetical Family of Three, for
Selected Earnings Brackets, on
AFDC for More than 12 Months
Earnings Bracket Marginal Tax Rate
98.15%
99.85
102.15
107.15
116.48
85.55
86.86
$300 - $400
400 - 425
425 - 525
550 - 650
650 - 674
750 - 850
850 - 917



